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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MICHAEL BENJAMIN, ARTHUR 0.
LLOYD, EDWARD DAVIS, FORREST H .GREENE, and WELDON
NOLLKAMPER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BERT LIETZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 7330

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is a suit instituted in the District Court for Salt
Lake County by Michael Benjamin, Arthur 0. Lloyd, Edward
Davis, Forrest H. Greene and Weldon Nollkamper, seeking
to enjoin the defendant Bert Lietz from operating the Sugarhouse Planing Mill. The trial court granted an injunction
• and defendant appeals.
I
STATEMENT OF PLEADINGS

The original Complaint alleges generally the operation
of the planing mill; that since 1943 the defendant has operated
3
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the mill after 6:00 p. m., and on Sundays. That it caused
loud and unusual noises; that in September of 1947, defendant
"installed a woodworking machine on the outside of his building," which he operated between 6:00 p. m., and 10:30 p. m.,
which he had not made a practice of doing prior to 1943.
That the plaintiffs were in lawful possession· o£ property in
the immediate locality of the mill and that the noises made
by the mill were "so loud as to make normal conversation in
the homes of the plaintiffs difficult and interferes with their
peace, quiet and enjoyment of their respective homes," and
that it interfered with their normal sleep;. (Tr. 1-4).
I

Defendant answers denying that the noises were loud or
unusual or that it made any noises except such as result from
use of power saws and planing machinery necessary for the
operation of the plant and affirmatively alleges that he installed
the machinery under the direction of public officials. That
the plant was established forty-four years ago by defendant's
predecessors-in-interest; that the land in the immediate vicinity
was vacant property, far removed from residential sections
of Salt Lake City, and while in operation, the plaintiffs and
their predecessors-in-interest erected dwelling houses near the
planing mill. That as wood working machines wore out and
became obsolete and demands for the products of the mill
changed, it became necessary to remove machinery, install
improved equipment, and during excessive demands for the
products of the mill, to operate the same for long hours, and
at times, continuously. Denies that the capacity of the mill
has been materially increased or the hours extended since
194~.
(Tr. 6-9).
4
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Shortly before the case was called for trial, the plaintiff
filed an amendment to the complaint setting up. the ordinance
of September 6, 1927, hereinafter quoted, and added the following paragraph:

nt

ld.
I~

"That the defendant's planing mill and plaintiffs'
property adjacent thereto are located within the commercial district of Salt Lake City and have been since
the enactment of such ordinance on September 1, 192i
That the defendant's plant since September 1, 1927,
has been enlarged beyond capacity of 50 horse power
in violation of the above alleged zoning ordinance, and
the defendants have made installations of additional
machinery and such alterations and additions of
machinery have not been confined to the building located upon the premises at the time the zoning. ordinances were passed, all in violation of said zoning
ordinances, and such violation continues to this date,
and the defendant threatens to continue such violation
indefinitely in the future." (Tr. 32).
An answer to the amendment was filed denying that installations or additions to the mill were in violation of the zoning

.:.-·,.
\.-.---

-~

,:_.

:~. :_..

: ~-···

ordinance.

(Tr. 35) .
II
STATEMENT OF EVIDENCE

The Sugarhouse Planing Mill was built by defendant's
father about 1900 at 2032 South lOth East Street, in Salt Lake
City, and operated by him until 1928. Defendant has operated
it since 1928. (Tr. 57, 107 and 166).
Benjamin's wife inherited property at 2028 South lOth
East Street and the Benjamins have lived there since 1934.
Mrs. Benjamin is a sister of defendant. The Benjamin resi5
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dence .is about 20 or 25 feet due north of the -mill.
76.. and 107).

(Tr. 75,

Plaintiffiloyd has resided at 2021 South lOth East Street
(rear) for about three years. His residence is across the
street from the planing mill. (Tr. 98).
Plaintiff Greene has resided at 1997 Lincoln Street, about
150 yards Northwest of the planing mill, for about eight years.
(Tr. 69 and ·70).
·Th~ Merrill Appliance Company, Inc., is located at 967
~ast Twenty-First South Street about 100 feet from the planing

mill.

(Tr. 131 and 132-).

During the years 1900 to 1944 the operationsof the plan.ing mill· were enclosed in one building situated near the street.
This building was about 45 or 50 feet long; East and West.
(Tr. 76). In February of 1944 under War Production Board
and City Building Permit a· new cinder block building, about
30·feet North and South and 62 feet East and West, was erected
West of the old building. (Tr. 58). In 1947 or 1948 (Tr.
61 and 86, a concrete slab was layed on the· South and West
of the cinder block building extending therefrom 9 feet on
the South and 16 feet on the West. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A).
The old building contained various machi~es used in
the; planing mill business. From time to time these machines
were replaced by· new machines because of obsolescence, efficiency, wearing. out, etc. Some of the new machinery so installed was noiser, and some not as noisy, as the replaced
machinery. (Tr. 146-149). The total aggregate horse-power

6
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of the motors in the old building from prior to 1927 has been
125 horse-power. (Tr. 105-106).
In the new building is installed the following machinery:
5 horse-power hand pointer
2 horse-power bench cut off saw
50 horse-power re-saw

5 horse-power tenoner
1¥2 horse-power moulding machine
10 horse-power rip saw

On the cement slab is located the following machinery:
Dust collector
30 horse-power planer
30 horse-power moulder
10 horse-power blower
the total aggregate power of the motors in the new building
and on the cement slab is 149¥2 horse-power. (Tr. 117 and
Plaintiff's Exhibit A) .
The hand-pointer, bench cut off saw and moulding
machine above referred to were old machines moved from the
old building to the new building. All of the other machines
were replacement items for machines discarded with the exception of the re-saw, dust collector, moulder and blower. The
last four machines did not replace other machinery. (Tr.
150, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). The
blower was installed under the direction of the Salt Lake· City
fire marshal as a safety measure. (Tr. 143 and 144). The
re-saw was installed on order of War Production Board. (Tr.
150). All changes in the plant, increases in horse-power and
installation of additional machinery requiring permits from
7
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Salt Lake City have been authorized by such permits. · Tr.
144 and 145).
At all times since September 6, 1927 there has been m
effect in Salt Lake· City the following ordinances which plaintiffs pleaded:
"Sec. 6720.

Commercial District.

(a) All buildings and premises may be used for any
purpose permitted in Residential "A," "B," "B-2" and
"B-3" districts and Business "A" district and also for
any trade, industry or use except the following, which
are hereby prohibited, subject to provisions of Section
6728 of this chapter and of paragraph (b) hereunder.
46. Planing mill or woodworkings plant using in
excess of 50 horsepower."
"Sec. 6720B: Stables, lumber yards, fuel yards, dyeing
and cleaning establishments, public garage, mortuary,
wholesale milk distributing stations, sheet metal works,
machine shops, laundries, mattress factories, lumber
mills, planing mills, or food products manufacture
shall not be permitted in Commercial districts within
one hundred feet of a dwelling or apartment house."
"Sec. 6728. Nonconforming use.
Any use of buildings or premises at the time of the
passage of the. Zoning Ordinance· on September 1,
1927, may be continued, although such use does not
conform to the provisions hereof. In the· case of a
building such use may be extended throughout the
building, provided that no structural alterations are
made therein, except those required by law or ordinance. Providing no structural alterations are made,
a nonconforming use may be changed to any use permitted in a district where such nonconforming use
would be permitted. Any nonconforming use changed
8
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to a more restricted use or to a conforming use shall
not thereafter be changed back to a less restricted use.
No non-conforming building which has been damaged
by fire, explosion, act of God or act of the public
enemy, to the extent of more than sixty ( 60) per cent
of its assessed value, shall be restored except in conformity with the regulations of this ordinance.
Any nonconforming use building, existing in any
residential district at the time of the passage of the
Zoning Ordinance, September 1, 1927, may be reconstructed or replaced to conform with all requirements for a Residential "B-3'' district, including all
required yard spaces." (Tr. 31, 32, 35 and 168).
The Utah Power & Light Company furnishes power for
the Sugarhouse Planing Mill. According to its accounts the
Demand Kilowatt (kilowatt demand rating on a 15-minute
basis each month) for every month in the year 1947 was
less than 35. (Tr. 123). In 1948 some months were above
35 and some months were below. (Tr. 123 and Plaintiffs'
Exhibit B) . The average Demand KW of the months in
1948 was 36.6. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B). A kilowatt is equal
to 1000 watts and 745.7 watts is equal to one horse-power.
35 kilowatts equals approximately 50 horse-power. (Tr. 121
and 122).
Defendant's father, prior to 1927, and defendant, since,
with a crew of several men, worked in the planing mill at
night. (Tr. 119). Plaintiffs testified that until 1943 the
operations of the planing mill were quietly conducted and
did not bother them. (Tr. 70, 71, 77 and 78). In 1942 and
m 1943 defendant made boxes for the government resulting
in loud noises caused by men hammering nails and boards.

9
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Men .were employed at night to carry on this work. (Tr. 70,
.71, 79 and 82). In the latter part of 1943 the noise was increased by the filing and the use of band saws. (Tr. 79 and
80). Benjamin described it as a very piercing noise. (Tr. 80).
The plaintiffs testified the noise could be heard in the Benjamin
house with the doors and windows closed. However, the
noise did not bother the occupants of the Merrill Appliance
Company, Inc. situated next South of the planing mill. (Tr.
131 and 132). Plaintiffs complained of the planer in the fall
of 1947 or spring of 1948. (Tr. 73). Pliiintiffs' chief complaint was of the noise occurring on week-day nights. (Tr.
90, 91, 100, 104 and 112). Plaintiffs did not complain of
noise occurring on Sunday, except for the operation of the
blower. (Tr. 113).

III
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS
Upon the pleadings and evidence as hereinabove abstracted, the court made findings of fact to the effect that in 1943,
the defendant commenced running the machinery after 6:00
P.M. and on Sundays, and that he employed from five to
thirty men. That the· defendant operated the mill until 10: 30
or 11:00 practically every night. (Tr. 39-40).
That toward the end of the year of 1944 defendant
erected a cinder block building about 30 x . 60 feet and a
cement "apron" along the side of his building. That he constructed "a huge blower and dust collector," located on the
10
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outside of the building. That the planer, blower and dust
collecter "make loud, unusual and penetrating noises which
can be heard distinctly in the homes of all of the plaintiffs;
that said noises are so loud as to disturb the plaintiffs ip. their
enjoyment of their premises," all of which had never before
existed. (Tr. 40).
That
"Since 1943 the defendant has increased the installed
horsepower capacity of his said plant; that during the
entire year of 1947 the defendant used more than fifty
horsepower of electricity each month and said plant
has a rated horsepower capacity in excess of fifty
horsepower. That during most of 1948, including
the time when the defendant was under a restraining
order issued by the above entitled court, the defendant
used more than fifty horsepower of electricity in said
plant." (Tr. 40).
all of which increased the noise emanating from the said mill.
That the defendant's employees caused loud and unusual
noises, and in addition to the operation of the planing mill,
that the defendant made noises in the manufacture of wooden
boxes. (Tr. 41).
That the operation of the outside machinery including
the blower and dust collector caused dust and shavings to
blow about the neighborhood which did not result before
the installation of the outcide machinery. That the defendant
prior to 1943 did not operate the machinery after 6:00p.m. The
court finds that the plaintiffs occupy their property as residents
and that the noise interferes with the enjoyment of the property.

(Tr. 41).
11
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That the ordinances hereinbefore set out were enacted
on September 6, 1927, and that the defendant's planing mill
is. :within the. commercial district of Salt Lake City, and ''that
_the defendant's plant since September 1, 1947, has been enlarged beyond the capacity of 50 horse-power in violation
of the above zoning ordinance." (Tr. 42- and 43).
The court draws the following conclusions:
1. That defendant should be enjoined from operating
his plant "after 6:00 p. m. on any day" and "for any purpose
on any Sunday." (Tr. 44).

2. That defendant should be enjoined from utilizing at
any time more than fifty horsepower of electrical energy.
(Tr. 44).
3. That defendant should be enjoined from operating

any outside machinery.

( T r. 44) .

4. "That the defendant should be permitted to go to his

shop himself at any time of day or at any time during the
night, but he should be enjoined from engaging in any type
of work on his premises after 6: 00 p. m. at night and until
7: 30 the following morning and all day on Sundays if such
work will create any noise which will disturb the peace and
quiet of the neighbor~ood, or which can be heard by the plain~iffs if! their homes."_ (Tr. 44).
::

1

5. "That no employees other th~n the defendant should

be placed in said building except for nightwatchman or the
doing ·of work which will cause no noise between the hours
of 6:00 p. m. at night and the following morning at 7:30
12
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a. m., and all day on Sunday, and the defendant should be
enj?ined from operating his plant at all and from starting
said machinery for any purpose or from operating his saw
filer or his machines to any extent whatsoever, either for the
working of machinery or for the setting of said machine for
the doing of work the following day between the hours of
6:00 p. m. and 7:00 a. m. of the following morning and all
day on Sunday." (Tr. 44).
The decree specifically enjoins the defendant from operating or permiting ·the operation of his machinery between 6: 00
p. m. and 7:00 a. m., and all day on Sunday, from causing
to be used at any time more than fifty horse power of electrical energy or any type or kind of energy, from operating
any type of p<;>wer driven machinery on the outside of the
building and specifically a 30-inch planer, the blower and
dust collector and all machinery located on the concrete apron
and finally the court finds the defendant guilty of contempt.
(Tr. 46 and 47).

·

IV

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER-

ING A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT GRANTING THE
PLAINTIFFS ANY RELIEF WHATSOEVER FOR THE
REASON THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

13
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
OF FACT NO.4 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE INCRE~SE
IN CONSUMPTION OF HORSE-POWER SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED THE NOISE EMANATING FROM THE
PLANING MILL FOR THE REASON THAT THERE IS
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH
FINDING. (Tr. 40 and 41).
3. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
OF FACT NO.7 TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT
HAD NEVER OPERATED THE PLANING MILL AFTER
6:00P.M. PRIOR TO 1943, FOR THE REASON THAT THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT SUCH FINDING AND
IS CONTRARY THERETO. (Tr. 41 and 42).
4. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING
OF FACT NO. 12 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PLANING MILL HAS BEEN ENLARGED BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF 50 HORSE-POWER, IN
VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE NO. 6720, FOR THE
REASON THAT SAID ORDINANCE DOES NOT APPLY
TO DEFENDANT'S PLANING MILL:. (Tr. 43).
5. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO.1 TO THE EFFECT THAT DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ENJOINIED FROM OPERATING HIS
PLANT AT ANY TIME AFTER 6:00P.M. ON ANY DAY
AND AT ANY TIME ON SUNDAY FOR THE REASON
THAT ·suCH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO THE
LAW·. (Tr. 44).
14
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6. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO.2 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM UTILIZING
AT ANY TIME MORE THAN 50 HORSE-POWER OF
ELECTRICAL ENERGY IN HIS MILL FOR THE REASON
THAT SUCH CONCLUSION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Tr. 44).
7. THE COURT ERRED IN DRAWING CONCLU-

SION OF LAW NO.4 AS FOLLOWS, TO-WIT: "THAT
THE DEFENDANT ...· SHOULD BE ENJOINED FROM
ENGAGING IN ANY TYPE OF WORK . . . AFTER
6:00P.M. AT NIGHT AND UNTIL .7:30 THE FOLLOWING MORNING AND ALL DAY ON SUNDAYS IF
SUCH WORK WILL CREATE ANY NOISE WHICH WILL
DISTURB THE PEACE AND QUIET OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD, OR WHICH CAN- BE HEARD BY THE PLAINTil"FS IN THEIR HOMES," FOR THE REASON THAT
SUCH IS WITHOUT AUT~ORITY OF LAW. (Tr. 44).
8. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECREE
ENJOINING THE DEFENDANT FROM .OPERATlNG
HIS PLANING MILL AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO 7:30
A.M., AND AFTER 6:00P.M. ON ANY DAY AND AT
ANY TIME ON SUNDAYS FOR THE REASON THAT
IT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW. (Tr. 46).
9. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECREE
ENJOINING DEFENDANT FROM USING OR CAUSING
TO BE USED AT ANY TIME MORE THAN 50 HORSE15
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;FOWER OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY FOR THE REASON
THAT SUCH IS CONTRARY TO LAW. (Tr. 46).
,

',

10. THE
COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTER'

ING JUDGMENT ENJOINING THE DEFENDANT FROM
OPERATING POWER MACHINERY LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE BUILDING AND PARTICULARLY: FROM
OPERATING A PLANER AND A BLOWER FOR THE
REASON THAT THE SAID BLOWER WAS INSTALLED
UNDER THE ORDINANCE AND DIRECTIONS OF SALT
LAKE CITY. (Tr. 46 and 47).
11. THE COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING AND DECREEING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT
OF COURT FOR THE REASON THAT HE WAS NOT
TRIED FOR CONTEMPT. (Tr. 47).

v
POINTS ARGUED BY APPELLANT
(a) THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
The defendant is in trouble with the law because he likes
to work. His father before him liked to work. They liked
to work in their own mill in their own way and do their work
~hen called for. For nearly half a century, the father and
t~c:;11 the son owned and operated a planing mill at 2032 South
lOth. East Street, beginning when it was in harmony with the
time to work and when there was no one in the .immediate
16
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neighborhood ·who wanted to sleep while the defendant and
his father wanted to work. Times have changed. Work by
the defendant, at least in his own shop, on his own time, and
in his own way must cease at 6:00 in the evening and must not
begin before 7: 30 in the morning, and work of any character
must not be done on Sunday. At least, that is what the court
has said in this case. Baseball may go on. Sleepers are not
molested by the assembling of noisy crowds at the games.
Garages may do their work day or night and Sundays. Pool
halls, etc., apparently are not banned: but the sawing and
planing of lumber, which is music to the ears of this defendant, is. outlawed. ·
Authority for the violent restnctlon and limitation on
the right to work, imposed by this judgment must be found
m the law if this judgment is sustained.
We, therefore, turn to the pleadings in this case for the
purpose of finding, if we can, an allegation of fact upon which
to base such restrictions upon the use of property as are imposed by the court. The original complaint does not justify or
support the decree entered.
It is alleged the defendant in the war years, worked day
and night making boxes for the Army. During the time
th~ demands of war existed, no one complained of day and
night work. The government wanted the boxes, and the
defendant made them. The allegations, therefore, respecting
that work, are in no sense a justification for the entry of a
decree enjoining the defendant from beginning work before
7:30 in the morning or continuing it after 6:00 in the even-

17
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ing. The time of beginning and ending work, as so fixed,
is entirely arbitrary. There is nothing in the pleading whatsoever justifying that arbitrary time. There is nothing in the
pleading and nothing in the law which in any sense justifies
an injunction forbidding the defendant from entering his own
place of business during those hours and taking with him
men necessary to do the work.. The extent to which the court
went in restricting the defendant is emphasized by conclusion
No. 4 that defendant should be enjoined from engaging in
any type of work on his premises "after 6:00 p. m. at night
and until 7: 30 the following morning and all day on Sundays
if· such work will create any noise which will disturb the peace
and quiet of the neighborhood, or which can be heard by the
plaintiffs in their homes." That is the spirit of the findings
and judgment and would form the basis of a contempt proceeding were the defendant to give way to his feeling and work
when he felt he ought to work. One may search the rather
prolix complaint in vain for anything that even suggests a
restriction.
Even though the pleading contained allegations to the
effect that it was the desire of the plaintiffs to be shielded
fromnoises of that kind from 6:00p.m. to 7:30 the following
morning, it would have no support in the law. Possibly, aside
from statutes and aside from ordinances, noises would justify
interposition of a court, still nothing is made to appear by this
pleading to justify such a judgment. A planing mill means
lumber will be sawed· and planed. Necessarily, that means
noise, but unless machinery is running smoothly and unnecessary vibration eliminated, the planing mill is not efficient and
18
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must necessarily fail. Something out of the ordinary must b.e
alleged and proved to justify such restrictions and the restrictions must be reasonable.
Terrell-vs. Wright, 87 Ark. 213, 1125 S.W. 211.
After reviewing many cases, it is stated iri Note II of
the Annotation, Bartel vs. Ridgefield Lumber Company reported in 37 ALR 683, at page 690, paragraph 1, the following:
"The right absolutely to enjoin the operation of f.
saw or planing mill in a manner constituting it a
nuisance has been recognized, but the injunctions actually issued as to such mills generally have been of a
restricted character. Courts interfere by injunction
against such establishments with great cau~ion, and
only in cases where the facts are weighty and important,
and the· injury complained of is of a serious and permanent· character.''
(b) PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE DECREE ENJOINING THE DEFENDANT FROM "STARTING THE
MACHINERY LOCATED THEREIN AT ANY
TIME ON SUNDAY" IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY
UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE STATE.
Broadbent vs. Gibson, 140 P 2d 939.
or under the ordinances of Salt Lake City.
Gronlund vs. Salt Lake City, 194 P 2d 464.
The Decree is arbitrary and unreasonable.
(c) THE ORDINANCE PLEADED STATES NO
CAUSE OF ACTION.
The pleader evidently assumed that a mill with a potentiaJ horse-power, in excess of fifty, was unlawful. The ordinance justifies no such inference. A mill existing on Septem-

19
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ber 1, 1927, could be continued in harmony with the ordinance
in the manner in which it existed at the time the ordinance was
adopted.. This mill had a power plant in excess of SO
horse power at that time. As to what horse-power was being
used is not made to appear. Machines wore out, became ob.
solete and were ·replaced with other machines. Complaint
was made as to shavings and dust, and at the instance of the
city, a dust collector was installed and the receptacle for the
dust was placed outside of the building. In fact, the old
building, like machinery, became unsuitable for use, and a
cinder. block room was added in the rear. Nothing, however,
was done except under the direction and supervision of the
city. There is added to the amendment to the Complaint, a
paragraph no doubt intended to bring the defendant under
and subject to the ordinance. The pleader says:
"That the defendant's plant since September 1, 1927,
has been enlarged beyond the capacity of SO horse
power in violation of the above alleged zoning ordinance." (Tr. 32).
No facts were pleaded. The fair interpretation of this sentence is that any power plant, in excess of 50 horse-power, is
violative of the ordinance.
Further,
.. and the defendants have made installations
of additional machinery and such alterations and addi~
tions of machinery have not been confined ·to the
building located upon the premises at the time the
zoning ordinances were passed, all in violation of
said zoning ordinances." (Tr. 32).
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That again does not bring the defendant under the ordinance
to the extent that the decree limiting the available power at
the plant is in violation of the ordinance. Furthermore, the
ordinance reads:
"planing mill or woodworkings plant using in excess
of 50 horsepower." (Tr. 31).
.
The potential available horse-power is not the criterion. It
it the use of the horse-power only which would bring the
defendant within the_ ordinance. In 1948, apparently the defendant used about 1Y2 horse: power more than 50 horse-power
at one time. The record is not clear as to whether that continued for any appreciable length of time. But, there is still
lacking any evidence to the effect that the defendant did not .
use in excess of 50 horse-power prior to September 1, 1927.
He had it available for use, and there is no pretense on the
part of the plaintiffs that the defendant did not use in excess
of 50 horse-power in this plant prior to the date of .the ordinance.
Clearly the. burden was upon the plaintiffs to allege and
prove the horse-power used by defendants prior to September
1, 1927, and the horse-power used subsequent thereto. There
was neither pleading nor proof of the former essential fact.
The potential horse-power prior to September 1, 1927, as disclosed by the power of the various machines, was 12 5. The
. potential horse-power at the time of the trial was 150. The
actual horse-power used before September 1, 1927, is not made
.to appear, and the maximum used horse-power since that time,
as above observed, is slightly in excess of 50. The plaintiffs'
21
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case was therefore incomplete as prediCated upon the ordinance and even though it appeared that the defendant had
in fact used 1Y2 horse-power in excess of 50 or the power used
before 1927, the limitation of the injunction of the court
should be as to the excess power only. It would have nothing
whatsoever to do with the hours of work, much less justify
the practical closing of the shop except during the specified
hours.
(d) CONCLUSION NO. 4 IS ERRONEOUS AND
PREJUDICIAL FOR IT PUTS IT WITHIN THE
POWER OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO SAY WHETHER THE DEFENDANT MAY OR MAY NOT DO
WORK IN HIS SHOP DURING THE FORBIDDEN
TIME FOR IT IS FOR THEM TO SAY WHETHER
THEY CAN HEAR A NOISE.
Whether that kind of conclusion would mean that the
noise must be loud enough for all of the plaintiffs to hear a
noise at the same time, or whether the defendant would be
in contempt of court if noise is heard by one· of the plaintiffs
only is not clear. The mere statement indicates the ridiculous
basis for determining whether the defendant is in contempt
of court. The conclusion is equally ridiculous insofar as it
applies to Sunday work. There is no statute or ordinance in
any respect justifying this conclusion.
The decree itself is without support in the pleadings, in
the evidence, in the findings, or in the law. Specifically the
limitation of hours from 7:30a.m. to 6:00 p. m. is arbitrary,
unreasonable and without authority of law.
There is no law or evidence justifying the injunction barring Sunday work.
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The ordinance does not justify a limitation to 50 horsepower.
The blower was installed at the instance of the city and
hence its use is not subject to injunction under' the· ordinance.
(e) THE FINDING OF DEFENDANT GUILTY
OF CONTEMPT WAS WITHOUT HEARING. AND
PREJUDICIAL.
After the CO!Jlplaint was filed pending the trial of the
case, it was stipulated that the defendant would not operate the
planing mill between 7:00 p. m. and 7:00 a. m. and on Sundays between 7:00p.m. and 9:00a.m. (Tr. 15).
On July 31, 1948, an order was issued requiring the defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be
punished for c~ntempt. (Tr. 23). There was no hearing
upon the order. to show cause at any time, notwithstanding
which the court found him guilty of contempt. It is true no
punishment ·was imposed but it was a warning that punishment
would be imposed if the defendant made a noise which "could
be heard by the plaintiffs in their homes."
In conclusion, it is submitted that the judgment is erroneous, far beyond any support in the pleadings in the evidence
or in the findings of fact and that the judgment should be
reversed with directions to dismiss the case.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, BAYLE & RUSSELL,
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
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